UPC is serving Museveni’s divide & rule policy
By Suleman Mugula
13th Sept 2010
To Museveni the man, the withdrawal of UPC from the IPC was an early Christmas present from his acerbic critic Dr. Olara Otunnu. Many of his supporters are now blowing their trumpets loud prophesying not only the collapse of the IPC, but also the defeat of the opposition in the 2011 elections.
On the contrary, I think UPC’s departure from the IPC has neither impoverished it, nor enriched Museveni’s NRM. It is only Museveni the individual who has gained from Otunnu’s decision to withdraw UPC from IPC.
I say that because while UPC’s withdrawal does not increase the NRM’s support, it nonetheless fits well in Museveni’s long term strategic plan to rule Uganda until he is ready to pass the baton to his son Lt. Col. Muhoozi Keinerugaba.
UPC’s withdrawal is similar to many previous episodes that Museveni has exploited to the fullest. So there is nothing new there. It’s just that UPC doesn’t seem to have learnt any lessons from history. Apart from the obvious advantages of having a joint election front against Museveni, the IPC was a very serious means by which UPC could have bridged the gap it created between northern and central Uganda.
Indeed, the issue of disunity between northern Uganda and central Uganda is one of the most important factors which made it possible for Museveni to usurp power and to continue holding on to it for as long as he has.
The 1966 crisis tragically brought an end to the cosmetic unity Uganda had forged after independence. It badly fractured relations between northern and central Uganda. Secondly, it also introduced the gun into the politics of our country. It was both a blow and a wakeup call for politically ambitious Ugandans from other regions who did not have access to guns.
Museveni picked up the signals very well and begun his preparations. His preparations led to the formation FRONASA. After the 1966 crisis, Museveni also knew that as long as the North was still dominant in government, it would be easy to manipulate central Uganda. And he manipulated central Uganda by appealing to its negative sentiments over the 1966 crisis.
Museveni was also confident that after Obote 1 and Idi Amin, central Uganda would be willing to be led by anybody; even if he came from the moon! The only thing that mattered to them was that that person must not be from the north and Museveni fitted the bill.
Immediately after independence, it became clear that central Uganda was pivotal for anyone to successfully rule Uganda. So from the beginning, Museveni’s strategy was to embark on “sowing the hatred seed” between UPC, northern Uganda, and central Uganda. In short, it was a divide, confuse, and rule strategy. This has been the consistent weapon in Museveni’s political life.
But let’s get back to the IPC debate. Whether it was done consciously or unconsciously, the IPC could have actually mended the long standing fracture that had developed between northern Uganda and central Uganda. Therefore, the IPC, with UPC included, had a real chance to re-introduce the sense of nationalism and patriotism that Museveni has swept out of the minds of the people of Uganda within a mere 25yrs.
Even if Museveni will not publicly admit it, privately, he and his “mafia clan” quietly hoped and prayed that the IPC marriage doesn’t last. The withdrawal of UPC from the IPC was therefore sweet victory to Museveni without him firing a single bullet. I say that on the assumption that the allegations of Mao being Museveni’s secret [IPC] assassin are false.
As far back as 1979, Museveni and his FRONASA were only accommodated because Ugandans desperately needed anyone who was willing to join the war against Idi Amin. Museveni was neither a decorated soldier nor a decorated political figure. He wasn’t a threat to anyone. When Amin’s government fell in April 1979, the top politicians of the day failed to realise that people like Museveni weren’t actually interested in national unity under Prof. Yusuf Lule.
Indeed, that unity was swiftly disrupted when Lule was unceremoniously removed from power. When people demonstrated and senior army officers like Oyite Ojok were considering reinstating Prof. Lule, Museveni jumped in and unleashed soldiers onto the masses! Typically, he then blamed it all on Oyite Ojok.
In fact, Oyite Ojok and the other liberators had not quite appreciated the character of the person they were working with. By the time they realised, Museveni had already elevated himself into national political significance. He was now the Vice Chairman of the ruling Military Commission. END. If it’s Monday, it’s Uganda Correspondent. Never miss out again!
Note: Mr. Suleman Mugula returns next week with more on this subject.
